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Eduardo Basualdo and 
Bernardo Kosacoff* 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the more 
salient features of the performance and evolution of 
foreign capital in the Argentine economy during the 
military government which was in power from 1976 
to 1983. In the introduction, a brief summary of the 
long-term situation is given, with emphasis being 
placed on the fundamental role which foreign capital 
has played in the economic development of 
Argentina throughout its history. Section One 
contains a discussion of the evolution of foreign 
investments authorized to establish themselves in 
the country, special aspects of their capital 
contributions and their distribution by sector and 
country of origin and, finally, an analysis of those 
investments which were channelled to the financial 
sector and those which originated in the United 
States. 
In Section Two, the international presence in 
the manufacturing industry is discussed. The 
situation is analysed at two levels. Firstly, 
background information is given to throw light on 
the position held by the transnational corporations 
in the structure of industry, and secondly, their 
evolution within the sector during the past decade, 
when the Argentine economy underwent a far-
reaching process of deindustrialization, is discussed. 
With regard to the period under study, the 
authors stress that, although considerable incentives 
were offered to encourage foreign investments, such 
investments did not come in on a large scale, mainly 
because of the recessive conditions which prevailed 
from the mid-1970s onwards and because of 
misgivings about the possible duration of the policy 
of openness. When the opportunities offered by the 
market over the short and medium term are limited, 
it is not enough to set up an institutional framework 
designed to encourage foreign investment. 
•Consultants to the EC1.AC Office in Buenos Aires. 
The authors appreciate the collaboration of Javier Carduzo. 
Introduction 
Since it began to take part in the international 
division of labour, Argentina has been a major 
recipient of foreign investment, and foreign 
investment has, in turn, played a major role in 
building the country's structure of production. 
Both when the country was mainly an exporter 
of agricultural products and during the period of 
import substitution —either during the early 
stage of light industry or the later stage when the 
process was extended to the production of 
intermediate and durable goods— foreign 
corporations have played a strategic role, and 
have acted as the moving force behind the 
structural changes which have taken place in the 
economy. 
During the period of crop and stock 
production for external markets, foreign capital 
controlled the linkages which guaranteed the 
internal operation of the accumulation model 
and the provision of foods and raw materials for 
the metropolis (England), the country of origin 
of most of the investments. Investors 
concentrated their attention on refrigeration 
plants, commercial activities pertaining to 
imports and exports, the ports and, especially, 
the railways because of the role these activities 
played in the model and the potential for 
accumulation which they offered. 
As the agroexports model began to decline 
—even before the definitive crisis of 1930—, 
there was a contraction in the flow of new 
investments associated with that accumulation 
pattern. The few firms which did establish 
themselves in the country were mostly from the 
United States and they tended to do business in 
fields other than that of agricultural exports. 
During the transition between periods when 
agricultural exports prevailed and the stage 
when the industrial sector became the dynamic 
nucleus of capital accumulation, foreign 
investment was oriented towards specific 
sectors. New investments were concentrated on 
import-substitution manufacturing activities. At 
first, they were oriented towards industries 
which produced final goods associated with the 
consumption patterns of those strata of the 
population which, having a high average 
income, represented a heavy and growing 
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demand for manufactures. That was the case 
with many food industries —fundamentally 
agroindustrial ones, reflecting the transition 
between the two models— textiles, construction 
materials and some final chemical products and 
electrical consumer goods. These were mainly 
light industries in whose development foreign 
capital played a major role, without actually 
dominat ing or controlling the industries 
concerned. 
Nevertheless, it was not until the late 1950s 
or early 1960s tha t the t r ansna t iona l 
corporations began to play a hegemonic role in 
the substitution process, which by then had been 
extended to intermediate and durable consumer 
goods. Industries such as the petrochemical, 
automobile, machinery and equipment or metal 
products and engineering industries were at the 
fore during this second stage of the substitution 
process; they were set up through foreign 
enterprises which, soon after establishing 
themselves, became part of the entrepreneurial 
élite of the country. 
Although the total amount of investments 
approved between 1958 and 1962 did not 
1. Trends in direct foreign investment and 
investment patterns, 1976-1983 
After the brief period of the Peronist 
government (1973-1976), which regulated the 
central aspects of the management of 
transnational corporations in the country, the 
military government eliminated the main 
restrictions which had been placed on foreign 
investment, by establishing the new system 
provided for in Act 21382. 
The new authorities' aim —in which they 
partly succeeded— was to dismantle the classical 
represent a significant contribution to capital 
accumulation in industry (around 10% of capital 
formation in the sector), the fact that they were 
concentrated in a few strategic activities (the 
relatively more dynamic ones, which had 
modern technologies, markets controlled by an 
oligopoly and a high accumulation potential) 
brought a profound transformation of the 
industrial structure and meant that the 
transnational corporations played a leading role 
in those industries which by their very nature, 
give impetus to the deve lopmen t of 
manufacturing in the country. 
The new accumulation pattern of the 
Argentine economy was based on the industrial 
sector and hence, as foreign investments 
matured, they became one of the main 
foundations of this accumulation. Although, in 
quantitative terms, foreign capital did not reach 
the magnitude it had at the beginning of the 
century (before World War I it represented 51 % 
of gross investment), it did play a fundamental 
role because of the degree to which it controlled 
the dynamic poles of capital accumulation and 
reproduction. 
protectionist system, to change the economic 
structure of the country and thus to modify the 
role of the various economic agents and sectors. 
Argentina thus embarked on a new experiment 
which dramatically changed the accumulation 
model which had become firmly established 
after the Second World War. According to 
Kosacoff (1984), the policy put underway in 
April 1976 consisted, in essence, of trusting in 
the market mechanisms for the allocation of 
resources —thus making it necessary to carry out 
a programme designed to liberalize the 
market— and of seeking to establish greater 
I 
The transnational corporations and the opening-up 
policy of the last military government 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: AUTHORIZED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY FORM 
OF CONTRIBUTION, 1977-1983 
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1 310 511 
1 460 486 
612 564 
283 296 
5 489 411 
Source; Prepared by the authors on rhe basis of information supplied by the Foreign Investment Department of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
links with the exterior. With regard to the latter, 
tariff reforms —aimed at opening up trade— 
and financial reforms were implemented in 
order to remove restrictions on the inflow and 
outflow of capitals. In addition, import duties, 
the exchange rate and the real interest rate were 
used jointly as basic tools in the struggle against 
inflation. This anti-inflationary objective was 
constantly given priority over the medium-
r a n g e a c c u m u l a t i o n p roces s and the 
improvement of income distribution. The axes 
of economic policy were the establishment of a 
more realistic price system (which entailed 
eliminating regulations, taxes, subsidies and 
privileges) and the consideration of comparative 
advantages taken in a static sense. These two 
elements were the central indicators to be used 
in the estimates to be made by corporations in 
measuring the efficiency of the investment 
process. 
We have quoted from this passage at length 
because it provides a useful macroeconomic 
frame of reference for assessing the response of 
direct foreign investment to the great variety of 
incentives which were offered from 1976 
onwards and for studying the development of 
the foreign corporations established in the 
country. 
As a result of the incentives received and of 
the consolidation of a favourable environment 
for carrying out certain highly profitable 
operations with a minimum amount of risk and a 
rapid rate of return on capital, direct foreign 
investments authorized to set up business in the 
country grew steadily up to 1981, and then 
declined sharply in 1982 and 1983 (table 1). 
Up to 1983, authorized foreign investments 
amounted to a total of US$ 4 772.6 million, i.e., 
at an annual rate of US$ 681.8 million during the 
period under study (1977-1985), or US$ 784.2 
million in constant 1983 dollars. 
This influx of direct investments took place 
during two clearly differentiated subperiods. 
During the first, from 1977 to 1981 —coinciding 
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with the tenure of Dr. Martínez de Hoz and the 
full application of the policy of openness— 
direct foreign investment rose steadily to a level 
of approximately US$ 1.5 billion. During the 
second stage (1982 and 1983), on the other hand, 
investment fell considerably; this phenomenon 
was associated with a series of events, such as the 
departure of Dr. Martínez de Hoz, the 
discontinuation of the openness policy and the 
successive devaluations of the peso, which 
created an atmosphere of insecurity for foreign 
investors. In brief, the economic programme 
announced in April 1976 was gradually 
abandoned. 
As regards the forms taken by direct foreign 
investment , table 2 shows that of the 
investments authorized between March 1977 
and December 1983, a little over half (50.1%) 
consisted of new capital contributions, 9.7% 
represented capitalization of external credit, 
31.4% came from reinvestment of profits and 
the remainder (8.8%) represented automatic 
capital contributions. 
In view of the different ways in which these 
investments were made, the actual significance 
of the nearly US$ 5 billion worth of foreign 
investments entering the country over a period 
of seven years is relative. A partial review of 
some of these investments brings to light a 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: AUTHORIZED FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1977-1983 
(Accrued total and annual averages. Thousands of 1983 dollars) 
Accrued total Annual averages 
1) New capital contributions 
2) Capitalization of credits 
3) Total authorized investments 
(l) + (2) 
4) Reinvestment of profits 
5) Automatic contributions 
6) Total investment (3)+(4)+(5) 
1977-1981 
2 369 755 
451 523 
2 821 278 
1 434 365 
337 908 









2 757 230 
533 455 
3 290 685 
1 749 710 
449 016 






















series of aspects and special situations which 
give a much better picture of their magnitude 
and nature during the period considered. 
New capital contributions brought in during 
the seven years (US$ 2 423.8 million) included 
VS$ 702.3 million worth of temporary 
contributions to the production of oil and natural 
gas and an unspecified —but significant— 
amount of ex terna l resources for the 
denationalization of companies financed by local 
capital (La Isaura, Calera Avellaneda) or, in 
other cases, a simple increment in the share held 
by parent companies in the capital of local firms 
in which they already held the majority of 
stocks.1 In either of the two cases —either 
denationalization or increased participation in 
the capital of a local subsidiary— even though, 
formally speaking, the investment involved a 
particular type of "new capital contribution" 
from abroad, there was no increase in the 
'Some of the most noteworthy examples are: Corning 
International Corporation, to increase its participation in the 
capital of Cristalerías RigoUeau S.A.; Química Hoechst in Indur 
S.A.; Massey Ferguson Limited in Perkins Argentina S.A. and in 
Massey Ferguson Argentina S.A.; Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation in Galileo Argentina ¿ISA.; Federal Mogul 
Corporation in INDtiCO Minoli SA1C; Renault Argentina S.A. 
(controlled in turn by Régie Nationale des Usines Renault) in 
Metalúrgica Tandil S.A.; Philips Argentina S.A. (controlled in turn 
by NY Philips Gloeinlampert) in Salvo S.A. 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information supplied by the Foreign Investment Department of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
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production capacity of the country and no more 
than a mere transfer of ownership of already 
existing capital. 
A similar case which deserves separate 
treatment, however, because of its implications 
and the magnitude of the resources involved, is 
that of the purchase by Volkswagen of the assets 
of Chrysler Fevre Argentina. This transaction 
actually represented an inflow of external 
resources which at the same time entailed a 
repatriation of capital by Chrysler (a United 
States firm) and a displacement of national 
capital (51.3% belonged to local parts dealers 
and agents). Nevertheless, the official statistics 
only show the investment authorized for 
Volkswagenwerk A.K. of West Germany 
—US$ 102 million— with Chrysler Fevre 
Argentina as the receiving corporation. 
The magnitude and evaluation of the direct 
foreign investment authorized between 1977 
and 1983 only serve as a partial and inadequate 
indicator when it comes to assessing the results 
obtained during the period in question; 
moreover, the absence of official information on 
the repatriation of external capital makes it 
impossible to quantify the net effect of the policy 
aimed at attracting direct foreign investment 
and thus invalidates any appraisal of its successes 
and failures. 
2. Distribution of direct foreign investment by 
sector and by country of origin, 1977-1983 
The changes in the accumulation model which 
were brought about as a result of certain 
characteristics of the country's economic 
development from the late 1970s onwards are 
reflected in the sectoral distribution of direct 
foreign investment authorized between 1977 
and 1983. As during the period when 
agricultural exports were predominant or during 
the different stages of import substitution the 
orientation of foreign capital was associated 
with the role played by the various sectors of 
activity at the macroeconomic level and with the 
accumulation pattern concerned. Thus, during 
the period when the industrial sector was no 
longer the dynamic pole of capital accumulation 
and reproduction and that role was assumed by 
tertiary activities in general and by the financial 
sector in particular, the manufacturing industry 
ceased to be almost the only centre of attraction 
of direct foreign investment in the country. 
The sectoral composition of foreign 
investment between 1977 and 1983 reflected a 
turnaround in the historical trends of the 
postwar period, as there was a sharp decline in 
direct foreign investment in industry which was 
offset by the increasing importance of the 
services, commerce and finance sectors. The 
resulting profile thus tended to be a reflection of 
the policy of opening up to the exterior, under 
which most of the goods-producing sectors were 
subordinate and the dynamic axis was 
transferred to financial circuits and to service 
activities. 
Among the investments authorized (not 
those actually made) up to December 1980 (402 
proposals were approved out of a total of 508 for 
the period 1977-1983), the sectoral distribution 
of the 166 new firms which would have been 
established under the 402 proposals clearly 
shows the sectoral preferences of the foreign 
investors and the importance of non-production 
activities (table 3); only 29 would be industrial 
firms (17.5% of the total), i.e., the same as the 
number of marketing firms and fewer than the 
number of firms in the services sector (34). 
Complementary facts may be ascertained 
from an analysis of the distribution of authorized 
foreign investment by sector of destination, for 
which purpose the capitalization of loans and 
new capital contributions channelled towards 
new or existing firms must be considered as part 
of such investments (table 4). 
Almost 60%) of the investments were 
concentrated in only three areas, i.e., temporary 
investments in oil operations (24.6%), the 
automobile industry (17.4%) and the finance 
and banking sector (16.6%). If investments in 
oil, are left out, the automobile industry becomes 
the main receiving sector (US$ 495.4 million). 
Of investments authorized for the sector, 33.7% 
(USS 167 million) were for "capitalization of 
loans", in most cases, these were used to improve 
the structure and the. economic and financial 
situation of the receiving firms, which had been 
seriously affected by the setback suffered by the 
sector as a whole. New capital contributions 
(USS 328.4 million) were accounted for by the 
entry of a new international firm (Volkswagen) 
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Table 3 
ARGENTINA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF NEW FIRMS SET UP ON THE BASIS 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
AUTHORIZED BETWEEN 1977 
AND 1980 











































Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (1981). 
and the investment plans of Ford (a new truck 
plant) and Fiat. Within the context of a far-
reaching sectoral r eorgan iza t ion , these 
investments were offset by the closing down and 
the consequent repatriation of capital (in the 
first three cases) of General Motors (1978), 
Citroen (1979) and Chrysler (purchased by 
Volkswagen), Industrias Mecánicas del Estado 
(1980) and the merger of SAFRAR and Fiat 
(Sevel). 
The greatest net inflow of external capital 
took place in the financial sector and, more 
specifically, the banking sector. Authorized 
investments amounted to US$ 473.6 million, 
thanks to the entry of fifteen new foreign banks, 
which is evidence of the growing interest of 
international financial groups in setting up 
operations in the country. 
On the other hand, the relative lack of 
interest shown by foreign investors in putting 
their capita] into the manufacturing sector one 
of the most affected by the policy of openness, 
may be seen in the figures showing the number 
of industrial firms established up to December 
1980. Table 4 shows that —despite the influence 
of the automobile sector— the various branches 
oí industry as a whole represent slightly less 
than half the authorized investments (48.3%); 
during any other subperiod of the last three 
decades, industry had always accounted for over 
Table 4 
ARGENTINA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AUTHORIZED BETWEEN 
1976 AND 1983 
(Thousands of dollars at current 
prices, and percentages) 
„ . Percent-Sector Amount 
ages 
Exploitation of gas and 
petroleum 
Primary activities (agriculture, 
fishing and mining) 
Motor vehicle industry 
Machinery and equipment 
Petrochemicals 




Other industrial activities 
Construction 
Financial institutions and 
banking 































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of infor-
mation supplied by the Foreign Investment 
Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
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90% to 9 5 % of all direct foreign investment 
established in the country. There is no question 
that the manufacturing industry ceased to be the 
predominant sector as far as the attraction of 
foreign capital is concerned. 
Contrary to what happened in the case of 
changes in the sectoral composition of foreign 
investments the distribution by country of origin 
of these investments did not vary greatly with 
respect to the legislative trends of the last few 
decades. As regards the high concentration in a 
few countries and the relative share represented 
by each of them, the structure did not differ 
substantially from that of any other postwar 
period, nor —except in the contrasting cases of 
the United Kingdom and Italy— was there much 
variation with regard to the stock of foreign 
capital accumulated in the country around the 
mid-1970s (table 5). 
Table 5 
ARGENTINA: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
AUTHORIZED BETWEEN 1977 
AND 1983, BY COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN OF INVESTMENT 
(Thousands of dollars at current 












Others (19 countries) 
Total 
Amount 


























Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of 
information supplied by the Foreign Investment 
Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Almost 70% of the total amount of direct 
foreign investment authorized between 1977 
and 1983 was accounted for by firms from only 
three countries (United States, Italy and France); 
if investments from four other countries (West 
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and Spain) 
are included, the figure increases to 90%. 
Of the remaining countries of origin, the 
only ones worth mentioning would be the 
negligible presence of Japan (1.4%) and the 
United Kingdom which, with only 0.7% of the 
total, ranks thirteenth in the listing of countries 
of origin of investments. 
3. Direct foreign investment in the 
financial sector of Argentina 
The substantial amount of direct foreign 
investment that was placed in the financial 
sector may be explained, to a large degree, by the 
fact that the high degree of liquidity of the 
financial market coincided with the search for 
new investment opportunit ies and the 
application, at the local level, of a policy of 
openness, which involved an effort to attract the 
attention of the world banks. The financial 
reforms of mid-1977, the widespread 
liberalization of the capital market, the exchange 
lag policy and its effect on the spread between 
domestic and external interest rates were some 
of the main factors which created favourable 
conditions for arousing the interest of the 
foreign banks. These local phenomena occurred 
simultaneously with the high liquidity of the 
international market and the intensification of 
oligopolistic competition among the world 
banks, essentially as a result of their growing 
transnationalization. 
As a result of this combination of 
circumstances, there was a considerable influx of 
foreign capital to the financial sector of 
Argentina, especially to the banks. Hence, direct 
foreign investment in the sector had the greatest 
economic impact during the period, because of 
its effect on the shaping of the financial market. 
Around 1983, total authorized investments in 
the sector amounted to US$ 473-6 million, as a 
result of the approval of fifteen investment 
proposals which, in every case, had to do with 
the establishment of new banks in the country. 
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This influx had two interesting features, i.e., its 
distribution over time and the forms of 
establishment involved, The investments were 
highly concentrated in time; thus, slightly over 
9 5 % were authorized within a three-year period 
—between late 1978 and late 1981— and the 
fifteen banks were actually established in 1979 
and 1980 (table 6). 
The concentration of these investments in 
time had to do with the fact that around the end 
of 1978, the openness policy took a new turn; 
thus, with a "monetary approach to the balance 
of payments", the financial market was opened 
up completely, thanks to the elimination of 
barriers to international capital flows. In 
addition, an exchange lag policy was applied 
which provided opportunit ies for highly 
profitable investment, essentially in the 
financial circuits. The combined effect of the 
new legislation on foreign investment, the 
financial reform of 1977 and the liberalization of 
the capital market was to arouse increasing 
interest among the international banks in 
establishing themselves in the country. 
As regards the way in which the new banks 
set up their operations in the country, in only 
three of the fifteen cases did they purchase local 
banks, i.e., Irving Trust purchased Banco 
Table 6 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OVER 
TIME OF AUTHORIZED FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
(Thousands of dollars, and percentages) 
. , a Thousands Percent-
1-III-1977 to 31-V1IM978 17 256 3.7 
l-IX-1978 to 30-1X-1981 452 111 95.5 
l-X-1981 to 31-XII-198;, 3 932 0.8 
Total 473 569 100.0 
Source: Foreign Investment Department of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
"The dates of the subperiods correspond to those of the 
periodic reports issued by the Foreign Investment 
Department. 
Austral; Bank of America purchased Banco 
Internacional, and Crédit Lyonnais purchased 
Banco Tornquist. The remaining banks (12) 
which started business during the period in 
question established new local firms. 
This method of penetration, which was 
different even from that used by the foreign 
banks towards the late 1960s, had to do with the 
type of business carried out by the new banks 
(foreign transactions and non-traditional 
services for a small core of users), which was 
different from the type of activities carried out 
by most of the local banks (receiving deposits 
and granting loans). 
Although the number of firms almost 
doubled, the influence of the foreign banks on 
the local market showed hardly any variation 
between 1976 and 1983 (table 7). 
In late 1976, when the neomonetarist goals 
of the economic authorities had become clearly 
evident, the foreign banks had recovered part of 
the share in total deposits on the commercial 
circuit which they had lost during the Peronist 
government. Thus, while in 1974 they received 
15% of the total, by the end of 1976 they 
controlled 16.5%. 
Towards the end of 1978, as a result of the 
restrictions imposed by the Central Bank on the 
opening up of new subsidiaries, the foreign 
banks' share fell back to the levels of the early 
1960s. Suffice it to say that, while between 1970 
and 1977, the foreign banks reduced the number 
of their branch offices from 223 to 219, the 
banking system as a whole increased them from 
2 298 to 3 152 (table 8). 
This loss of the foreign banks' share in total 
deposits received and the decline in the number 
of branch offices had to do with the type of 
business in which they engaged, inasmuch as 
they chose to compete in the area of interest 
rates while at the same time, as a result of the 
institutional reclassification brought about by 
the reforms and the different style of 
competition prevailing, in which there seemed 
to be a ranking of the banks' spatial capacity to 
attract deposits, there was a substantial increase 
in the total number of commercial banks and 
their branch offices (Feldman and Sommer, 
1984). 
At any rate, with the new influx of direct 
foreign investment in the banking sector 
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Table 7 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN BANKS 
IN THE PESO DEPOSITS MARKET 
(Number of entities, and percentages) 
Indicator 1974 1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Number of foreign banks 
Share in total commercial bank deposits 
Share in total private commercial banks deposits 
Share of private commercial banks (national 
and foreign) in total private and State 






















45.8 52.3 60.3 59.8 59.8 52.9 56.7 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, 
Table 8 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF QUANTITY OF BANK BRANCH OFFICES 
BY SOURCE OF CAPITAL 






















































































Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
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towards the end of 1980, the transnational banks 
recovered a good deal of the ground they had lost 
between 1971 and 1978. From a 13.3% share of 
all deposits in the hands of commercial banks, in 
1978 they managed to attract 17%. 
It was not until 1981 that the foreign banks 
also began to apply a policy of opening up branch 
offices as a way of improving their 
competitiveness; in just one year, the number of 
branch offices rose from 241 to 373. To a large 
extent, this proliferation of branch offices seems 
to have been a residual effect of the succession of 
bankruptcies and interventions of national 
private firms which began with the closing down 
of the Banco de Intercambio Regional in March 
1980. Several of the foreign banks belonging to 
the "retail and diversified" sector purchased 
some of the branch offices of liquidated 
institutions from the Central Bank. 
The results of 1982 also reflect, to a large 
extent, the impact of the Argentine-British 
dispute over ownership of the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas) and che Georgia and Southern 
Sandwich Islands. Part of the deposits sought 
refuge in State entities and part of the deposits ín 
foreign banks were channelled to firms that 
were less vulnerable, in the users' view, to the 
hazards of the armed conflict. Between 1981 and 
1982, the transnational institutions' share in 
total resources handled by commercial banks fell 
from 17.0% to 14.2%. In 1983 —when 
expectations centred on the restoration of the 
country's institutional stability—, there was a 
slight improvement in the level of deposits 
accumulated by the foreign banks. As regards the 
total amount in the hands of commercial banks, 
their share rose from 14.2% to 16.8%, two 
points below the record set in 1969. 
In addition to discussing the position of 
the transnational banks in the local market 
(either in peso deposits or in number of bank 
offices), it is worthwhile analysing the ways in 
which their influence was exercised within the 
banks themselves. To this end, table 9 shows 
the share of the major firms in total deposits 
received by the transnational banks up to 
December 1983 —with the corresponding 
figures for June 1976— as well as their 
distribution according to country of origin of the 
capital, with the banks which started during the 
recent military régime shown separately. 
Some of the salient features of the 
transnational presence in banking activities are 
the following: 
a) The high degree of concentration of 
deposits in a small group of banks. One third of 
the banks (11) attracted a little over 80% of all 
deposits and four of them accounted for almost 
half (49.3%) of the total. 
b) None of the eleven firms entered the 
country during the recent military régime. That 
group includes two banks that were 
denationalized during the period in question, i.e., 
Tornquist (purchased by Crédit Lyonnais) and, 
indirectly, Internacional, absorbed by the Bank 
of America, which had already been doing 
business in the country. 
c) The absence of major changes, with 
respect to 1976, in the composition of the leader 
group or, at least, its size, which —one might 
assume— would entail almost doubling the 
number of firms set up by foreign capital. 
d) The average represented by the United 
States banks, both as regards the number of 
firms (11) and as regards their share in total 
deposits channelled to the foreign banks 
(51-2%); hence, 45.4% of the total is 
concentrated in only four banks. 
e) Finally, the clear difference between 
banks which entered the country before the 
recent military régime and those which entered 
during that period, as regards their ranking in 
the peso deposit market. While the former 
accounted for 82.9% of those deposits, the latter 
only accounted for the remaining 17.1%, if the 
analysis is confined to the new banks established 
during those years, the figure falls to 9.6%. This 
uneven participation once again shows up the 
different characteristics of the two groups, i.e., 
the former were predominantly "retailers" and 
"diversified", while the ones begun under the 
policy of generally open markets were 
predominently "wholesalers" and "specialized". 
4. United States investments in Argentina 
The direct foreign investments which entered 
the country during the recent military régime 
may also be analysed in the light of the official 
statistics of the countries of origin of those 
capitals. It is thus possible to compare the rate at 
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Table 9 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF EACH OF THE VARIOUS FOREIGN BANKS IN 
TOTAL PESO DEPOSITS IN THEIR HANDS 
Entity 
Ranking by deposits at December 1983 
The First National Bank of Boston 
Citibank 
Banco de Londres y America del Sur 
Bank of America 
Banco Tornquist" 
Supervielle Scoiété Générale 
Banco Popular Argentino 
Banco Sudameris 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Deutsch Bank 
Banco Europeo para América Latina 
Country 
(Percentages) 
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Distribution of deposits by date of 
incorporation of the transnational bank 
Banks installed before 1976 
Banks installed under the military government 
New banks 
Denationalizations 












Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
"In 1976 the Banco Tornquist was owned by local capital. Subsequently it was purchased by Crédit Lyonnais. 
*Refers to the Banco Internacional, purchased by the Bank of America and transferred in 1983 to its local subsidiary. 
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which capital was channelled to Argentina with 
its evolution at the global level, sectoral profile, 
profitability and the specific application of the 
benefits obtained from those investments 
(reinvestment or repatriation). With this 
information, a clear picture emerges of the place 
which Argentina occupies among all countries 
receiving foreign investments.2 
The first aspect to be studied is that of the 
changes that have occurred in respect of the 
stock of United States capital established in 
Argentina. Between 1976 and 1983, direct 
foreign investments of United States capital in 
Argentina rose from US$ 1 $66 million to 
US$ 3 054 million; this represents an average 
annual growth of 12.2% (4.4% per year in 
constant 1976 dollars). During the same period, 
total United States investments abroad, 
measured in constant values, declined slightly 
(table 10). 
Some comments are in order in connection 
with this sharply contrasting performance. 
Between 1976 and 1979, Argentina followed the 
trend noted at the international level, i.e., the 
export of United States capital continued to slow 
down, a phenomenon which had begun with the 
recession of 1974-1975. The dramatic increase in 
United States investments accumulated abroad 
between the end of World War II and the early 
1970s was a result of the dynamic evolution of 
the world economy and the steady expansion of 
production capacity at the international level. 
That growth was interrupted during the crisis of 
1974-1975, which seriously affected capital 
flows, especially those directed towards 
production. 
This behaviour fits into the overall picture of 
the evolution and cycles of the international 
economy. Within this framework, the rate of 
growth of United States investments in 
Argentina between 1976 and 1979 (1.7% per 
year) was quite similar to the rate recorded at the 
international level. 
'An analysis of the information supplied by the United States 
Department of Commerce will show the destination, at the 
international and local levels, of most capitals established outside 
their countries of origin. The statistics published by the 
Depart ment in its Surrey tif Current Busines\ make it possible to 
study the evolution and the main characteristics of direct foreign 
investments in each receiving country and hence to study those 
directed to Argentina in the last few years. 
This had not been the case during the 
preceding years. As a result of the recessive 
environment prevailing in the world economy, 
the general instability of exchange rates and of 
financial and monetary markets and the 
absence of a recovery of satisfactory rates of 
return on investments abroad (which fell 
steadily between 1979 and 1983), on the one 
hand, and, on the other, of the domestic 
pol ic ies fol lowed by the Repub l i can 
Administration, there was a steady decline, in 
real terms, of direct United States investments 
abroad (the cumulative rate was -1.6% per year 
between 1979 and 1983). On the other hand, 
United States investments in Argentina during 
the same period showed a real cumulative 
growth of 6.4% per year. This performance 
reflects the interest of United States investors in 
establishing their capitals in the country. An 
analysis of the sectoral content of this growth 
shows that it was spearheaded by two activities, 
i.e., oil and finance. Whereas in global terms, 
cumulative direct foreign investment increased 
2.2 times between 1976 and 1983, investments 
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF UNITED 
STATES INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA 
AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, 
1976-1983 













































Source; Prepared by the authors on the basis of data 
supplied by the United States Department of 
Commerce (several years). 
"Deflated by the United States wholesale price index. 
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Table 11 
ARGENTINA: ACCRUED UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY SECTORS 
OF ACTIVITY, 1976-1983 
(Millions of dollars at current prices) 






















































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by the United States Department of Commerce (several 
years). 
in oil rose more than 4.5 times and investments 
in financial activities grew more than fourfold. 
On t h e o t h e r hand , i n v e s t m e n t s in 
manufacturing industry, which historically had 
been preferred by United States investors, did 
not double, in current values, during those seven 
years, in constant" values, the cumulative annual 
rate of growth fell to 0.7% (table 11). 
As a result of this difference in growth 
rates, the sectoral structure of direct United 
States investments in Argentina changed 
substantially. Over a period of only seven 
years, the petroleum sector more than doubled 
its share of the total —12.7% in 1976 and 
26 .5% in 1983— and the share of the financial 
intermediation sector rose from 5.3% to 9.8%. 
As a result of the channelling of capital towards 
banking activities between 1979 and 1981, seven 
of the fifteen banks entering the country were of 
United States origin. 
In both cases, the growing participation of 
United States investments reflected the trends 
occurring at the international level, where, 
during the same period —1976 to 1983—, the 
share of the petroleum sector rose from 20.8% 
to 27.0% of cumulative United States 
investments abroad and that of the financial 
sector rose from 12.3% to 12.7%; investments 
in manufacturing, on the other hand, fell from 
44.8% to 39.9% (United States Department of 
Commerce, several years). 
It would appear that the nature of the 
process whereby the Argentine economy was 
opened up and, in that context, the economic 
activities which appealed most to foreign 
investors, were completely in line with the 
trends as regards sectoral distribution which 
prevailed in the export of United States capital, 
i.e., petroleum exploration and production and 
transnationalization of banks. This growth was 
offset by a decline in the manufacturing industry 
which, over the seven-year period, fell by more 
than 11 points in its ranking within the scheme 
of total direct foreign investments from the 
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United States accumulated in Argentina. The 
relative lack of interest in investing in one of the 
activities most seriously affected by the military 
government's economic policy appears to have 
been a constant phenomenon throughout this 
period and it affected almost every sector of 
industry. 
As regards the subsidiaries operating in 
Argentina, the census of direct foreign 
investments carried out by the United States 
Commerce Department in the late 1970s shows 
that in 1977, there were 279 subsidiaries of 
United States firms in Argentina; their total 
assets were equivalent to US$ 3 966 million, 
they employed 113 389 persons and their annual 
sales amounted to US$ 3 615 million. 
A l t h o u g h s e v e r a l i n t e r m e d i a t e 
combinations were possible, two extreme 
situations prevailed as regards the operation of 
transnational corporations established in 
relatively less developed countries, i.e., some 
produced for the domestic market and some 
were oriented towards the market of their 
country of origin or the world market in general, 
in the context either of the internationalization 
of production processes or of the supply of 
goods, essentially primary ones, at a lower 
relative cost. Table 12 shows the high 
proportion of total sales accounted for by the 
local market (84.6%), which was a result of their 
having been established under the import-
substitution model. Exports were almost 
marginal with respect to production for the 
domestic market. 
The low coefficient of local exports (15.4%) 
with respect to the world rate (38.1%) leads to 
the conclusion that most of the United States 
transnationals operating in Argentina were 
organized in terms of local demand and that, in 
general, exports represented surplus production 
beyond the levels of local demand (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1981). 
The captive trade of United States 
transnational corporations operating in 
Argentina was negligible. Whereas at the 
international level, 33.1% of the sales of the 
United States subsidiaries was accounted for by 
intrafirm trade, in Argentina, that trade 
amounted to no more than 9.3% and, as might 
be expected, it was only significant in the case of 
the small volume of exports to the United States, 
where it represented 87.5% of the total. 
Table 12 
ARGENTINA: SALES OF UNITED STATES FIRMS, BY GEOGRAPHICAL 
DESTINATION AND LINKAGE WITH THE PURCHASER, 1977 





























































Source; Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by the United States Department of Commerce (1981). 
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Table 13 
ARGENTINA; SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN 
UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
AND AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE COST, 1977 
11
 (Number employed, dollars and percentages) 
Sector of activity Number employed Percentage Average annual 






































































Source; Prepared on the basis of data supplied by the United States Department of Commerce (1981). 
The United States firms did not play a major 
role in creating employment in the country. In 
1977, they employed a total of 113 389 persons 
(table 13), i.e., 2.2% of total urban employment 
in the country (excluding the agricultural 
sector). As regards the sectoral composition of 
the jobs concerned, the manufacturing industry 
accounted for a high share, as it absorbed a little 
over 80% of all workers employed by the United 
States transnational corporations. Almost half 
those jobs were concentrated in two industries, 
i.e., t ransport equipment (basically, the 
automobile industry, which, at the census date, 
included three United States firms) and chemical 
and petrochemical products. Even though these 
are capital-intensive industries, between the two 
they generated more than 44 300 jobs in 1977. 
As regards the sectoral cost of labour, 
statistics compiled by the United States 
Department of Commerce show a wide 
scattering of wages among the different sectors 
in which the transnationals operated. Apart 
from the differences that can be attributed to a 
difference in the average skills of personnel 
employed, the magnitude of wage variations 
among sectors would appear to have been due to 
factors associated with the circumstances 
prevailing at the national level during the year 
when the Commerce Department census was 
taken. In 1977, the second year of the military 
régime, there were already clear signs of many of 
the effects of the economic policy applied after 
March 1976, which were later accentuated. 
Although the widespread contraction of real 
income of the wage-earning sector appears to 
have been one of the fundamental results of that 
policy, its impact differed depending on the 
economic sector concerned. Jobs in the 
manufacturing industry were the most seriously 
affected by the policy of "social discipline", 
inasmuch as in 1977, real wages in that sector 
were equivalent to only 66.3% of the real wages 
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for 1975. The contraction was not so sharp in 
most of the other economic sectors. This uneven 
evolution partly explains the structure of 
average costs of labour employed by United 
States subsidiaries operating in Argentina. 
In addition, around 1977, the sharp drop in 
wages which had occurred during the early years 
of the economic openness policy had a strong 
impact on the relation between average wage. 
costs in the country and those prevailing in other 
regions where subsidiaries of United States 
firms operated. Indeed, in 1977 (table 14), the 
average annual cost per person employed by 
United States subsidiaries operating in 
Argentina was lower than it was in any other 
grouping to which Argentina belonged (Latin 
America and the underdeveloped nations) and, 
of course, it was lower than the cost paid by those 
same subsidiaries in the developed countries. As 
a matter of fact, if the comparison is confined to 
the manufacturing industry, in which the 
country has a higher degree of industrialization 
and development than the rest of Latin America 
Table 14 
ARGENTINA: AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE 
COST IN UNITED STATES FIRMS 
IN ARGENTINA AND IN OTHER 
REGIONS, 1977 



































Source: Prepared on the basis of data supplied by the 
United States Department of Commerce (1981). 
or the underdeveloped countries as a whole, 
wage costs prove to be higher than the average 
in the underdeveloped countries as a whole but 
lower by almost 10% than the cost at the Latin 
American level. These results appear to tarnish 
the traditional international image of Argentina 
and, specifically, to detract from its position 
among the relatively less developed countries, 
whether these be defined as countries having an 
intermediate degree of industrialization or semi-
industrialized countries, or as the countries of 
the underdeveloped world in general. 
According to some indicators, Argentina 
may be compared to developed societies; 
according to others —the majority—, it may be 
compared to backward economies. However, 
very few of the latter comparisons are based on 
wage costs. If the Argentine economy has in any 
way been different from most of the 
underdeveloped world, that has been the case 
precisely in the area of wage costs, which could 
hardly be considered one of the country's 
comparative advantages at the international 
level. 
Although it is impossible to establish a direct 
correspondence between wage costs and the rate 
of profitability of United States investments on 
the basis of the information available, there is no 
question that the year 1976 marks a breaking 
point in the prevailing medium- and long-term 
trends as regards the profit margins of direct 
United States investments in the country. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, that rate never 
amounted to more than 6.5% of cumulative 
investment and, if one takes the analysis back to 
I960, the margin was never higher than 15% 
per year. Between 1976 and 1980, however, this 
percentage was surpassed during four of the five 
years and, during two of those years (1979 and 
1980), profitability rose to more than 30% per 
year.3 By comparison with the levels recorded at 
'The sharp tag in the exchange parity during those years 
generated a doubly positive effect on the profitability in dollars of 
transnational corporations. On the one hand, as a result of the 
maladjustment of exchange parity, the benefits obtained in local 
currency were increased, in real terms, at the world economy level, 
when expressed or converted into dollars or any other foreign 
currency. On the other hand, the lag in the exchange parity and the 
fact that the dollar was the only merchandise whose future price 
was known made it possible to apply highly profitable mechanisms 
in the local financial circuits to increase the disparity of interest 
rates with respect to those prevailing on the international markets. 
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Table 15 
ARGENTINA: COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF SOME INDICATORS CONNECTED 
WITH UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT THROUGHOUT THE 
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Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by the United States Department of Commerce (several 
years): 
"Profits in year i in relation to accrued investment in year i-1. 
Reinvested profits in relation to total profits. 
the international level during those same four 
years, the profit margin for operations in the 
country was more than 30% higher than at the 
world level (table 15). 
D e s p i t e t h e s e d i f f e r en t levels of 
profitability, the reinvestment rate for 
Argentina was lower than for the world as a 
whole during five of the eight years under study. 
In other words, despite the higher profit 
margins and the encouragement given to 
reinvestment within a framework of increasing 
permissiveness, the United States subsidiaries 
established in the country were, by comparison 
with those in the rest of the world, relatively 
more disposed towards remitting their profits to 
their parent companies, i.e., they tended to 
prefer rapid recovery of their investment over 
the incentives offered. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that at the end of eight years, the 
influx of direct investment from the United 
States to Argentina was much lower than the 
outflow of profit remittances and, on a lesser 
scale, the repatriation of capitals to the United 
States. Even without looking at other possible 
channels of transfer —royalties, administrative 
prices of captive trade— the net flow of capital 
to the United States arising from direct 
investments in Argentina amounted to US$ 781 
million; in 1983 values, this represents an 
average annual flow of more than US$ 100 
million (table 16). 
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Table 16 
ARGENTINA: CAPITAL FLOWS ASSOCIATED WITH UNITED STATES 
DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1976-1983 






































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by the United States Department of Commerce (several 
years). 
II 
The transnational corporations and the Argentine 
manufacturing industry 
The participation of transnational corporations 
in the manufacturing industry was studied at two 
distinct but complementary levels. Firstly, its 
structure within the sector was identified; 
because the census information used refers only 
to one year, the picture that emerges is a static 
but complete one. Secondly, the trend in respect 
of the transnational presence during the past 
decade was studied, by comparing the 
performance of transnational corporations and 
that of similar national-capital corporations 
(table 17). 
1. Economic impact and main characteristics 
a) Participation of transnational corporations 
in industrial production 
One of the main indicators of the magnitude 
of transnational participation in industry is the 
contribution of these firms to overall production 
in the sector (table 18). Firms with foreign-
capital participation controlled 30.8% of all 
industrial production reflected in the most 
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recent economic census carried out in the 
country (1974). 
This participation varied considerably 
among the different divisions of industry; it was 
relatively greater in those sectors which, because 
of their dynamism, rate of adoption of new 
technology and dynamic effect tended to be at 
the head of the entire industrialization process. 
The only sectors in which the transnational 
corporations played only a minor role were those 
which played a marginal role in the industrial 
profile of the country and which historically had 
the lowest growth rate. The difference in the 
participation of foreign-capital firms in the 
various sectors of industry were closely related to 
their growth rate and the degree to which they 
adopted new technology. 
As regards the link between the degree of 
oligopolization of the different branches of 
industry (five-digit classifications, ISIC, Rev.2) 
and the extent of the transnational presence in 
them, table 18 shows that most of the 
production of foreign-capital enterprises was 
generated in highly concentrated branches4 
(oligopolized) and that it tended to decrease as 
the competitiveness of the various strata of 
"* All analyses of the degree of concentration of industrial 
markets are based on the methodological criteria set forth by 
Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983). 
Table 17 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION, BY SECTORS OF ACTIVITY, 1973 
(Millions of 191'3 pesos, and percentages) 
Sector 




Textiles, clothing and leather goods 
Wood and furniture 
Paper, printing and publications 
Chemical industries 
Oil refineries 
Other chemical products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal industries 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Metal products, machinery and equipment 
Other manufactures 
Total 



























































Source; Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (Instituto 
National de Estadística y Censos - ÎNEC) (1974). 
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concentration increased. Thus, whereas 62 .1% 
of the production of transnational corporations 
was accounted for by highly concentrated 
branches, only 14.1% was generated in low-
concentration markets. 
In addition, the share of transnational 
corporations in industrial production declined as 
the concentration of the markets declined. 
Whereas the participation of transnationals in 
the manufacturing industry as a whole was 
slightly over 30%, their production in the highly 
concentrated branches was 47.9% and in 
competitive markets it was barely over 15%. 
The transnational presence in the Argentine 
industry was characterized by a preference, on 
the part of the transnational corporations, for 
highly concentrated markets, and it was in these 
that they placed a large share of their overall 
production —the largest share, in the case of 
highly concentrated branches having few 
establishments. 
As regards their sectoral distribution, 
table 19 shows that the preference of foreign-
capital firms for the more highly concentrated 
markets is to be seen in almost all industrial 
activit ies. In almost every case, the 
transnationals' share in the production of the 
highly concentrated strata was higher than their 
share in sectoral totals, and it declined as the 
competitiveness of the different strata increased. 
Table 20 shows the distribution and 
participation of transnational corporations in 
industrial production by type of goods, according 
to their functional destination and the type of 
market in which production was generated. 
In the first place, the table shows that 
transnational corporations were disseminated 
throughout the industrial spectrum. It was 
only in the area of non-durable consumer 
goods, which may be associated with relatively 
l e s s c o m p l e x t e c h n o l o g y , t h a t t h e 
transnationals' contribution (22.6%) was 
lower than its share in industry as a whole. On 
the other hand, their highest level of 
participation was in the area of durable 
consumer goods (59-2%); it should be noted 
Table 18 
ARGENTINA: PARTICIPATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, BY CONCENTRATION STRATA, 1973 



































































Source: Based on Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983). 
"HCB (F): high-concent rat ion branches with few establishments; HCB (M): high-concentration branches with many 
establishments; MCB: medium-concentration branches; LCB: low-concentration branches. 
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Table 19 
ARGENTINA: PARTICIPATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN 
THE VALUE OF PRODUCTION, BY INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 
AND CONCENTRATION STRATA, 1973 
(Percentages) 
Sector 




Textiles, clothing and leather goods 
Wood and furniture 
Paper, printing and publications 
Chemical industries 
Oil refineries 
Other chemical products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal industries 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 































































































Source: Based on Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983); INEC (1974). 
"HCB: high-concent rat ion branches; MCB: medium-concentration branches; LCB: low-concentration branches. 
that a large group of transnational 
corporations contributed to the development 
of this industry during the second stage of the 
substitution process. As regards capital goods 
—which play only a minor role, both globally 
and within the production of the transnational 
corporations— they were concentrated in a 
small nucleus of industries (tractors, 
communications equipment, electrical 
conductors) which, in most cases, were 
comparable to durable consumer goods, both 
because of their relatively recent development in 
the country and because of the possibilities of 
scale offered by the size of the market and the 
introduction of new technologies. On the other 
hand, the transnational presence was negligible 
in a wide variety of industries producing capital 
goods. The share of the transnationals in the 
production of capital goods (31.9%) was not 
very different from their share in total 
production of the manufacturing industry. 
One element which the four categories of 
goods had in common was the association 
between the magnitude of transnational 
participation and the level of oligopolization of 
the markets. Regardless of the type of goods 
concerned, the foreign-capital corporations 
always had a greater share in the highly 
concentrated markets and that participation 
tended to decline in direct proportion to the 
decline in the degree of oligopolization of the 
remaining strata. 
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b) Plant size and degree of control of foreign 
capital 
Table 21 shows the distribution, by strata of 
concentration, of the transnational corporations 
and of their establishments employing less than 
and more than 100 workers. It also shows their 
r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t r a n s n a t i o n a l 
p roduc t ion and the i r r ank ing in the 
manufacturing industry as a whole. 
Of the total number of establishments (824) 
belonging to foreign-capital firms (724), almost 
60% employed more than 100 persons at the 
time of the census. The prevalence of larger 
plants tended to increase in direct proportion to 
the degree of concentration of the markets 
concerned. Establishments employing more 
than 100 persons in the highly concentrated 
b r a n c h e s h a v i n g few e s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
represented 7 3 3 % of the total, whereas in the 
competit ive branches of industry, they 
represented less than half (49-0%). These 
disparities show that, in general, and even 
without taking into account potential production 
capacity, plant size requirements for operating 
in the more concentrated markets were not 
s i m i l a r , e v e n c o n s i d e r i n g on ly t h e 
transnationals, to the requirements for markets 
that were not very concentrated. Thus, there 
appears to be a relationship between the 
transnational presence in industry and the 
formation of oligopolistic market structures and 
between the latter and the relative size of 
manufacturing establishments. 
The predominance of larger plants is even 
more pronounced in respect of the contribution 
of foreign-capital en te rp r i ses to total 
production, which is also higher in the more 
concentrated strata. At the global level, 
establishments employing more than 100 
persons generated 93-4% of transnational 
production, and the percentage rose to 97.9% in 
the highly concentrated branches of industry 
with few establishments, while it fell to 84.3% 
in the less concentrated industries. 
Table 20 
ARGENTINA: PARTICIPATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY TYPE OF GOOD AND 








































































Source: Prepared on the basis of Khavis.se and Azpiazu (1983); INEC (1974). 
"HCB (F): high-concentration branches with few establishments; HCB (M): high-concentration branches with many 
establishments; MCB: medium-concentration branches; LCB: low-concentration branches. 
''Including branches 38434 "Rectification of motor" and 39099 "Miscellaneous manufacturing industries". 
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Table 21 
ARGENTINA: ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER THE CONTROL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, BY CONCENTRATION STRATA, AND THEIR 
PARTICIPATION IN THE TOTAL 












































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983); INEC (1974). 
"HCB <F): high-concentration branches with few establishments; HCB (M): high-concentration branches with many 
establishments; MCB: medium-concentration branches; LCB; low-concentration branches. 
Because establishments of transnational 
corporations represented only a small 
percentage of the total for industry as a 
whole -0.7%, it is advisable to find out why the 
two totals were so different. The units of 
production covered by the census included a 
large number of crafts or semi-craft activities 
and smal l shops — 8 5 . 6 % of the 
establishments counted employed less than 10 
persons— in which the transnational presence 
was virtually nil. This had a decisive effect on the 
comparison between the two totals, while the 
heterogeneity which was characteristic of the 
industrial sector and the national-capital firms 
as a whole was not evident in the case of 
transnational industry. This explains the very 
minor role played by transnational firms whose 
plants employed less than 100 persons (0.3%). 
On the other hand, transnationals controlled 
more than one fifth of all establishments 
(22.5%) comprising the subgroup of plants 
which employed more than 100 persons. 
Regardless of the size of the plant 
considered, the extent of the transnational 
presence was clearly related to the level of 
oligopolization. The percentage of plants 
belonging to transnational corporations tended 
to increase in direct proportion to the degree of 
concentration of the different strata. 
The fact that the transnational presence was 
greater in the larger plants and that their 
contribution increased in proportion to the level 
of oligopolization of markets was also reflected 
in the value of manufacturing production. All 
industrial firms which used foreign capital were 
considered on the same terms, i.e., without any 
distinction being made with regard to the level 
of foreign-capital participation or the degree of 
control such participation entailed. The study 
represents a preliminary analytical estimate 
which does not disregard the fact that foreign 
capital did not always hold majority ownership 
of local firms nor did it always exercise actual 
control over management. On the other hand, it 
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does not take into account criteria which might 
be adopted to identify a local firm as a subsidiary 
of a transnational corporation. 
In order to determine the type of ownership 
structure which characterized the presence of 
transnational capital in industry, three different 
groups of firms were listed, on the basis of 
whether foreign capital participation was above 
50.1 %, between 10.1 % and 50%, or below 20% 
(table 22). It was found that in 580 of the 724 
industrial firms using foreign capital, foreign 
investors controlled the majority of the capital 
and that foreign participation was below 20% 
only in 29 firms. 
As regards their share in the value of total 
production, it was found that 80% was 
generated by firms in which foreign capital 
controlled a majority of the capital, while only 
7.6% of the total was accounted for by those 
having less than 20%. 
No matter which indicator is considered 
—firms, plants or production— it is obvious 
that the transnational corporations preferred to 
operate where they could maintain a position of 
hegemony, of real control, without mediation, 
over their investments in local industry, to the 
detriment of any forms of association with 
national capital. This phenomenon also 
occurred, without major variations, in all strata 
of concentration and, independently of plant 
size, it was most evident in establishments 
employing more than 100 persons which 
operated in the most highly concentrated 
branches of industry where there were few 
enterprises. 
c) Diversification and specialization of 
production 
Another distinctive feature of transnational 
corporations in the manufacturing sector was 
the composition of enterprises at the local level. 
This differentiation within the sphere of the 
transnational corporations was a factor of 
Table 22 
ARGENTINA: FOREIGN-CAPITAL FIRMS AND ESTABLISHMENTS, BY DEGREES 
OF CONTROL AND CONCENTRATION STRATA, 1973 
(Absolute figures, and percentages) 
Stratum0 
Number of firms Number of establishments 
Production of transnational 
















































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983). 
"HCB (F): high-concentrât ion branches with few establishments; HCB (M): high-concentration branches with many 
establishments; MCB: medium-concentration branches; LCB: low-concentration branches. 
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Table 23 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, BY DEVELOPMENT OF 
THEIR INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY, 1973 
Subsidiaries 
linked to each 
transnational 
corporation 
Total With some industrial 
activity 
With no industrial 
activity 
Transnational
 c , ... . Transnational c , ... . Transnat ional c , ... . Subsidiaries Subsidiaries Subsidiaries 
corporations corporations corporations 
From 1 to 3 
From 4 to 6 
From 7 to 9 
































Source: Basuaido (1985). 
decisive importance during the tenue of Dr. 
Martínez de Hoz, when potential for growth and 
entrepreneurial development were linked to the 
extent to which the transnational firms 
diversified their activities, both within the 
manufacturing sector and in other economic 
activities. During the different stages of the 
import-substi tut ion process, the different 
transnational corporations found their place 
within the economic structure of Argentina 
according to the dynamics of capital 
accumulation and reproduction. These firms 
may be classified in two groups, according to the 
number of local firms they controlled, either 
totally or partially. The first group would include 
those which controlled or had a share in the 
capital of a few subsidiaries operating in a small 
number of markets and which usually tried to 
remit abroad a considerable portion of the 
profits earned in the country. The second group 
would be made up of transnational corporations 
which had majority or minority control over the 
capital of a variety of local firms, whose activities 
were integrated —vertically or horizontally— or 
diversif ied, th rough the format ion of 
conglomerates. In the latter case, reinvestment 
of profits represented a substantial proportion 
of direct reproduction, allowing for the opening 
up of new subsidiaries in the country (Basuaido, 
1984). 
The importance of the role played by 
diversified or in tegra ted t r ansna t iona l 
corporations becomes clearly evident from an 
analysis of their distribution in terms of the 
number of local subsidiaries (table 23). 
Table 23 shows that 55 transnational 
corporations (8.7% of the total) which had a 
majority or minority participation in the capital 
of seven or more subsidiaries together owned 
697 firms, i.e., 39.7% of all subsidiaries 
established in the country. When transnational 
corporations which controlled an industrial firm 
are considered separately from those which only 
controlled non-manufacturing local firms, it 
becomes evident that only nine of the 55 firms 
which had seven or more subsidiaries did not 
control any industrial firm. 
Industrial production was the central activity 
not only of the diversified or integrated 
transnational corporations, but also of those 
which had very few subsidiaries in the country, 
even though their relative importance was quite 
different. The relative importance of industrial 
subsidiaries fell sharply as the number of 
subsidiaries controlled by each transnational 
corporation increased (table 24). In the case of 
transnationals which owned from one to three 
local companies , the industr ia l firms 
represented 75.5% of their subsidiaries in the 
country, while in the case of those which owned 
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10 or more local firms, the industrial ones only 
represented 34.1% of the total. 
T h e low p r o p o r t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l 
subsidiaries and the high participation in overall 
production of the diversified or integrated 
transnational corporations can only be explained 
by differences in production scale, in which the 
larger relative size of those subsidiaries played 
an important part. The predominantly 
industrial insertion of foreign capital, based on 
ol igopol is t ic control of a number of 
manufacturing markets, was concentrated in a 
small number of transnational corporations 
which accounted for 43.5% of the industrial 
production of foreign firms and controlled the 
relatively larger industr ia l companies . 
Essentially, these were foreign capitals which 
had a share in the capital of major local industrial 
corporations started during the first or second 
stages of the import-substitution process. 
The most important non-industrial activity 
for transnationals which controlled ten or more 
local firms was the financial and insurance 
sector, in which 23.0% of the firms in question 
operated. Transnational corporations which had 
a larger number of related companies controlled 
Table 24 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIARIES AND OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS WITH ACTIVITY IN 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1973 
(Number of firms, millions of 1973 pesos, and percentages i 
Subsidiaries 
linked to each 
transnational 
corporation 
From 1 to 3 
From 4 to 6 
From 7 to 9 





















































. Percent -Amount 
age 
20 514 30.4 
9 916 14.7 
8 464 12.5 
20 927 31.0 


























Source: Basualdo (1985). 
"The industrial production of transnational enterprises (67 540 million 1973 dollars) includes the production generated by 
subsidiaries whose parent firm is unknown. This represents 7 719 million 1973 dollars, a sum equivalent to 11.4% of the 
total. 
b
 Average industrial size is obtained by dividing total production by the number of firms and of subsidiaries with industrial 
activity, respectively. 
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a significant group of firms organized under a 
s t rong process of cong lomera t ion and 
integration in which industrial production acted 
as the axis. Finance, insurance and other services 
were the most important non-industrial 
activities as they provided an essential structural 
link between production and the circulation of 
the economic surplus. 
2. The evolution of transnational industrial 
corporations during the past decade 
a) Evolution of the production of transnational 
corporations and their relationship with 
sectoral development 
The economic policy applied under the 
military régime set up in 1976 brought about a 
profound change in the orientation of and the 
trends followed by the development of 
manufacturing in the country, as well as in its 
role as the accumulation model of the economy. 
The results, i.e., the so-called "deindustriaHza-
tion" of the Argentine economy, speak for 
themselves (Kosacoff, 1984; Sourrouille, 
Kosacoff and Lucángeli, 1985). Thus, between 
1975 and 1982, the industrial GDP fell by 2 3 % , 
which means that the level recorded in 1982 was 
lower than that of the late 1960s; industrial 
employment fell by approximately 35%, which 
means that approximately 400 000 wage-
earners lost their jobs; almost 20% of industrial 
establishments closed down, real wages in 
industry declined by around 40%, labour 
productivity rose substantially as a result of the 
elimination of over-employment, "disciplining" 
of personnel and an increase in the number of 
intensity of hours worked, and investments in 
durable production equipments fell, on average, 
at a cumulative rate of 5% per year, to a level 
lower than that of capital depreciation values. 
The disarticulation of the industrial 
apparatus and the profound and prolonged 
sectoral recession led to a series of structural 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w h i c h e n t a i l e d t h e 
disappearance of many small, medium-sized and 
large firms, as well as a number of transfers and 
mergers of companies and, to a lesser extent, the 
addition of new factories. 
The industrial transnational corporations 
were not unaffected by these structural changes. 
On the contrary, they appear to have been the 
most active agents, particularly if one takes into 
account the qualitative implications of those 
changes which they were instrumental in 
bringing about. Table 25 shows that there was a 
slight decline in the share of foreign 
corporations in manufacturing production. 
While in 1973, the transnational corporations 
accounted for 30.8% of the value of industrial 
production, in 1981 they accounted for 28.6% 
and in 1983 for 29.4%. 
One major factor in the irregular evolution 
of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t r a n s n a t i o n a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n s in i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n , 
characterized by a slightly downward trend, was 
the closing down of some large-scale foreign 
corporations (General Motors, Citroen, Otis 
Elevators, Insud, Metalúrgica Austral and 
Olivetti), which more than offset the relatively 
higher participation of the remaining firms. 
Depending on the nature of the industrial goods 
concerned (non-durable consumer goods, 
Table 25 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 
1973-1983 
(Thousands of 1973 pesos, and percentages) 
Value of Share of 
Value of production trans-
Year total of trans- national 
production national corpora-
corporations tions 
1973 219 328.1 67 602.9 30.8 
1981 182 707.6 52 234.1 28.6 




1973-1983 -1.1 -1.6 
1973-1981 -2.3 -3.2 
1981-1983 3.8 5.3 
Source: Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983) and Basualdo 
(1985). 
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durable goods, intermediate goods and capital 
goods), this evolution provides another 
viewpoint and allows for a more accurate 
interpretation of the results to be made. 
Table 26 shows that the overall trend was due to 
the sharp deterioration in the share of foreign 
capital in the production of intermediate goods. 
While the participation of these firms in the 
production of non-durable consumer goods, 
durable goods and capital goods increased, their 
share in the production of intermediate goods 
fell from 31.5% to 25.8% between 1973 and 
1981 and recovered slightly in 1983 (27.3%). 
This phenomenon is related to the structural 
changes which took place in some major 
branches, such as the steel industry, which 
u n d e r w e n t —espec ia l ly before 1981 — 
substantial changes as regards the profile of 
production and the presence of transnational 
corporations. In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning the decline in the number of 
factories (especially sheet metal plants, but also 
some large establishments); the transfer of the 
participation of Belgium and French capitals in 
leading firms such as Tamet and Santa Rosa; the 
integration of the production process by the 
national firm Acindar and its notable growth in 
the steel market (absorbing firms such as 
Gurmendi, Santa Rosa, Genaro Grasso). As a 
result of this, and despite the slight recovery 
recorded between 1981 and 1983, the 
participation of foreign capital in national 
production fell by almost 40% with respect to 
1973. 
There was a similar decline in the 
production of non-ferrous metals, in which there 
Table 26 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN PRODUCTION OF THE 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
(Millions of 1973 pesos, and percentages) 























































































Source: Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983) and Basualdo (1985). 
"Excluding the two branches producing "miscellaneous goods". 
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Table 27 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF T R A N S N A T I O N A L CORPORATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION, BY CONCENTRATION STRATA 














































































Source: Khavisse and Azpiazu (1983) and Basualdo (1985). 
"The concentration strata considered are: HCB; high-concentration branches (eight establishments generated more than 
50% of production in the branch); MCB: medium-concentration branches (eight establishments account for between 25% 
and 50% of production in the branch); LCB: low-concentration branches (the eight biggest establishments contribute less 
than 25% of production in the branch). 
was also a sale to national capital of firms such as 
K1CSA and National Lead, the withdrawal of 
large foreign corporations (Insud and 
Metalúrgica Austral), and an increase in the 
importance of national capital as a result of the 
production of primary aluminium by Aluar S.A. 
As far as the other goods are concerned, 
there was an increase in the participation of 
foreign capital, which reached its peak in 
industries producing durable consumer goods 
(rising from 59-2% to 67.2% between 1973 and 
1983). This increase took place within the 
overall context of a serious decline in the 
production of durable goods which was 
associated with the crisis of the automobile 
industry and the electrical home appliances 
industry. In both cases, the contraction of the 
local market and the strong competition of 
imports led to a sectoral readjustment which, 
contrary to the case with intermediate goods, 
entailed an increase in transnational 
participation. The reorganization of the 
automobile industry (the withdrawal of General 
Motors and Citroen, the purchase of Chrysler by 
Volkswagen, the merger of Fiat and Peugeot and 
the closing down of the only non-transnational 
firm, Industrias Mecánicas del Estado), and the 
purchase of some local firms or of stocks in the 
area of electrical home appliances brought about 
an increase in the participation of foreign 
capital. 
When the industrial sector is broken down 
according to market structure, as shown in 
table 27, it appears that transnational 
participation in production generated in 
intermediate forms of concentration was 
relatively stable, while there was a considerable 
increase in the more competitive markets and a 
notable reduction in their contribution to 
production in the highly concentrated branches 
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which are essential for its structural 
predominance in local industry. 
The growing transnational participation in 
the less concentrated branches of industry 
occurred in a few activities in which that greater 
share probably entailed changes in the degree of 
concentration of those branches with respect to 
the results of the most recent industrial census 
(for example, the production of medicine). 
The decline in foreign participation in the 
highly concentrated branches of industry is one 
of the most noteworthy aspects of the period 
under study, A combination of two factors 
explains the loss of almost seven points in 
foreign participation (from 47.9% to 41.0%); 
firstly, the side-effects of the reorganization of 
the steel industry and secondly, the development 
of the different oligopolistic branches, which 
depended on the magnitude of the transnational 
presence in them. In the first case, the structural 
reorganization of the steel industry led to a 
decline in the importance of foreign capital, as a 
result of its deinvestment in the sector and its 
having taken a different course from that taken 
by the major national-capital firms. 
In the second place, the highly concentrated 
branches in which foreign capital represented a 
substantial share of production suffered, in most 
cases, a more far-reaching contraction than 
those equally oligopolistic branches in which the 
foreign presence was less significant. 
If a simplistic two-category classification is 
applied to the study —dividing the 
transnationais into those which controlled a 
small number of subsidiaries and operated in a 
limited number of markets, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, those which controlled a large 
number of local companies operating in a 
number of markets under an integrated or 
diversified system— it will be noted that the 
participation in industrial production of the 
latter type of corporation increased considerably 
by comparison with that of the transnationais 
which controlled a smaller number of 
subsidiaries in the country (table 28). 
The predominance of diversified or 
integrated transnational corporations in the 
industrial production of foreign corporations as 
a whole increased generally, with slight 
variations, regardless of the type of goods 
considered. With the sole exception of those 
producing intermediate goods, the corporations 
which controlled more subsidiaries increased 
their share while the share of those operating in 
a limited way fell, except in the case of the ones 
producing capital goods. This confirms the view 
that one of the main changes which occurred 
during the last ten years as regards the 
performance of foreign corporations in the 
manufacturing sector was the growing 
leadership of the diversified or integrated 
corporations. This phenomenon was a result of 
Table 28 
ARGENTINA: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 
BY NUMBER OF SUBSIDIARIES, 1973, 1981 AND 1983 
(Millions of 1973 pesos, and percentages) 
From 1 to 3 
From 4 to 6 
From 7 to 9 



































Source: Basualdo (1985). 
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the economic policy applied from the mid-1970s 
onwards. In that regard, the special 
characteristics of the diversified or integrated 
transnational corporations were precisely what 
gave them a different growth potential than that 
of the firms which only operated in a few 
markets. 
The performance of the transnationals 
was decisively influenced, in the first place, by 
the fact that the banking and financial sector 
began to play a leading role in their makeup. 
Only 4.9% of the firms controlled by less 
diversified transnationals were engaged in 
financial and insurance activities, while 23% 
of the firms controlled by highly integrated or 
diversified corporations operated in that area. 
As regards the substitution process, that 
structural difference did not mean there were 
differences of substance, since most of the 
industrial firms only needed to resort to self-
financing in order to operate normally in their 
markets. On the other hand, after the financial 
reform of 1977, with the generalized 
liberalization of interest rates and the role 
played by the financial liquidity of the 
different corporations and their case of access 
to financial circuits, that structural difference 
became fundamental for determining the 
growth potential of corporations. The 
financial connections of the diversified or 
integrated transnationals gave them several 
advantages —as well as high profit rates— 
during years when the shortage of financial 
resources or their high relative cost meant 
bankruptcy or going out of business for many 
enterprises engaged in production. 
Another factor which explains the growing 
predominance of diversified transnational 
corporations is the wide range of economic 
activities in which they engaged, which enabled 
them to constantly readjust their management 
to fit the macroeconomic circumstances, since 
after 1976, a succession of non-industrial 
activities proved to be the most dynamic and 
profitable sectors of the economy (the 
agricultural sector, construction, services in 
general and finance in particular), in addition, 
there was a structural difference which had to do 
with the defensive capability provided by the 
degree of vertical integration of the firms. 
In brief, the changes that took place within 
the structure of the transnational corporations 
had to do with the special nature of the 
deindustrialization process, and the hegemony 
of the diversified or integrated transnational 
corporations increased to the extent that it 
pervaded the entire economy. This trend 
contrasted not only with the evolution of the 
limited transnational corporations but also with 
that of industry as a whole and of the national-
capital industrial enterprises in particular 
(table 29). 
The diversified or integrated transnational 
corporations comprise the only subgroup of 
firms which did not suffer a decline in 
production between 1973 and 1983-
b) The industrial élite and the transnational 
presence 
In order to analyse the evolution of 
manufacturing enterprises after the breakdown 
of the democratic process (March 1976) and the 
subsequent application of a new economic 
policy, a group of 300 of the largest industrial 
Table 29 
ARGENTINA: CUMULATIVE ANNUAL 
GROWTH RATE OF INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION, BY CHARACTERISTICS 















Source; Basualdo (1985). 
"Comprising firms owned by State and private domestic 
capital. 
Controlling seven or more local subsidiaries. 
Controlling fewer than seven local subsidiaries. 
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firms, in terms of annual invoiced sales, was 
selected. These represent a little over half the 
industrial value added and reflect the changes 
which took place in the leadership of the sector. 
A comparison of the lists of the 300 largest 
industrial firms for 1976 and for 1983 shows 
sharp differences in the number of firms making 
up the élite and in their share of total sales for 
the group. In order to get a more accurate idea of 
the actual nature of these changes, the 300 firms 
were divided into three subgroups according to 
their ranking in the list (first, second and third 
hundred); in addition, a distinction was made, at 
the top, between the first 25 and the first 50. 
The results show that, over the seven years, 
foreign participation in sales of the industrial 
élite rose slightly (table 30). 
Nevertheless, this picture of relatively stable 
petformance, in which the growing importance 
of the transnational corporations appears to 
have been no more than an adjustment to the 
historical trends recorded since the early 1960s, 
covers up certain major modifications in the 
composition of the rankings of the firms, which 
only because of the contrasting effects, from the 
point of view of the source of the firms' capital, 
reflect that relative stability at the global level, 
albeit with a slight increase in the participation 
of the transnational corporations. 
Thus, for example, the fact that the 
transnational corporations comprising the 
group of the 100 largest industrial firms fell 
from 54 (1976) to 53 (1983) does not only imply 
that only one of those firms left the élite as a 
result of having gone out of business or having 
dropped in rank. On the contrary, of the 53 firms 
which occupied some of the first 100 places in 
1983, only 31 (58.5%) had also held those places 
in 1976, while then ranked between 101 and 200 
in 1983, another three were in the third hundred 
and two ranked below the 300. Three firms were 
added as the result of mergers or takeovers 
during the period (Sevel, a merger of Fiat and 
Peugeot; Nobleza-Piccardo, the product of the 
takeover of Piccardo by Nobleza; and Massalin-
Particulares, the product of the takeover of 
Particulares and Imparciales by Massalin and 
Celasco); another three were new firms added to 
the industrial part (Volkswagen: Rio Colorado 
—an oil consortium including the Italian firm 
SAIPEN— and Equitel, belonging to Siemens); 
and one was Isaura, an oil firm denationalized 
during the period. 
This phenomenon occurred, to a greater or 
lesser degree, regardless of the position held by 
the firms (table 31). 
The industrial élite underwent substantial 
•changes which, although not fully reflected in 
Table 30 
ARGENTINA: PARTICIPATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SALES 



















































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Prensa económica (November 1977 and October 1984). 
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Table 31 
ARGENTINA: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AMONG THE 300 LARGEST 
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS IN 1983. CHANGES WITH RESPECT 






After position No. 300 
New firms 
New firms resulting from absorption-
fusion of preexisting establishments 














1983 ranking scale 






























Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Prensa económica (November 1977 and October 1984). 
the transnational presence, represented a 
profound change, at the global level, in the 
composition of foreign-capital enterprises 
holding a hegemonic position in local industry. 
These changes were, fundamentally, the result of 
significant shifts among the transnational 
corporations set up in the country before 1976; 




By the end of the past century, one of the salient 
features of the Argentine economy was the 
strong presence of foreign capital. Because of its 
importance to the vital activities of the 
agricultural exports model (transport, services 
pertaining to foreign trade, cold storage), it 
played a leading role in the development of the 
economy and had a high accumulation potential. 
As the agricultural exports model gradually 
declined and the first signs of the new 
accumulation pattern —based on import 
substitution— appeared, foreign investment 
took on new forms, i.e., the export-related 
sectors tended to be displaced by activities that 
were primarily related to manufacturing and 
aimed at meeting domestic demand. 
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Both during the first stage of the 
substitution process, when the emphasis was on 
light industry, and during the second stage, when 
the substitution of intermediate goods and 
durable consumer goods began, foreign capital 
took over the areas having the greatest potential 
for growth. As in the case of the agroexports 
model, the foreign presence tended to become 
polarized towards the more dynamic nuclei of 
capital accumulation. 
Between the mid-1960s , when the 
investments btought in during the late 1950s 
had matured, and the mid-1970s, the 
transnational corporations took full advantage 
of the opportunities provided by a domestic 
market that was heavily protected from 
international competition, without there being 
any need of a new influx of large direct 
investments. 
From 1976 onwards , however, the 
condi t ions under which the Argent ine 
economy developed changed radically. In that 
context, despite the strong incentives offered 
—essentially, the general opening up of 
markets, with the concomitant guarantees that 
entailed— new direct investments were not 
significant. The relatively small amount of 
foreign capital that was brought in was mainly 
directed toward the exploitation of natural 
resources, especially oil and gas, and toward 
banking and financial activities pertaining to the 
provision of specific services to a limited 
clientele and to the new opportunities arising 
from the opening up of the capital market. 
The trends followed by United States 
investments in the country tended to 
corroborate those sectoral trends. Also, it is 
evident that the transnational corporations 
established in the country, especially those 
operating in the aforementioned sectors, made 
large profits. Nevertheless, despite these high 
profits, the corporations did not follow an active 
policy to reinvestment. Quite to the contrary, it 
appears that, at the global level, priority was 
given to rapidly recovering the capital invested 
—through remittances of profits and even 
repatriation of capital— rather than to 
reinvesting in the country beyond the levels of 
profit that such reinvestment might generate. 
This performance which, in principle, may 
seem to depart from what is considered typical, 
was due to the profoundly recessive conditions 
which prevailed from the mid-1970s onward, in 
the country's economy, especially in its 
manufacturing sector. To this was added a 
climate of uncertainty as to how long the policy 
of openness would be followed. In that regard, it 
seemed logical to assume that most of the 
transnational corporations would give priority 
to remitting their profits to their parent 
c o m p a n i e s and would m i n i m i z e new 
investments in the country. This was especially 
true in the industrial sector, where to the scanty 
flow of new external capital was added the 
withdrawal from the market and subsequent 
repatriation of capital of large transnational 
corporations, as well as a high level of 
remittances of profits to parent companies. This 
can be explained by the exhaustion of market 
opportunities, without which the legal and 
ins t i tu t iona l incent ives offered to the 
transnational corporations were not enough to 
induce the foreign firms to make investment and 
reinvestment decisions that were closely linked 
to the market (Sourrouille, Gatto and Kosacoff, 
1984). 
In any event, within the far-reaching process 
of deindustrialization that took place, the 
transnational corporations did not follow any set 
pattern. Even though their overall share of total 
industrial production fell slightly, a significant 
group of those firms —those having a greater 
degree of diversification or integration of 
production— tended to account for an increasing 
proportion of total production and even more so 
of the production generated by the transnational 
corporations. 
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